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Abstract.     The wireless ad hoc networks are highly vulnerable to distributed denial of service(DDoS) 
attacks because of its unique characteristics such as open network architecture, shared wireless medium 
and stringent resource constraints. These attacks throttle the tcp throughput heavily and reduce the 
quality of service(QoS) to end systems gradually rather than refusing the clients from the services 
completely. In this paper, we discussed the DDoS attacks and proposed a defense scheme to improve the 
performance of the ad hoc networks. Our proposed defense mechanism uses the medium access control 
(MAC) layer information to detect the attackers. The status values from MAC layer that can be used for 
detection are Frequency of receiving RTS/CTS packets, Frequency of sensing a busy channel and the 
number of RTS/DATA retransmissions. Once the attackers are identified, all the packets from those 
nodes will be blocked. The network resources are made available to the legitimate users. We perform the 
simulation with Network Simulator NS2 and we proved that our proposed system improves the network 
performance. 
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1    Introduction 
Wireless networks are inherently susceptible to security problems. The intrusion on the 
transmission medium is easier than for wired networks and it is possible to conduct denial of 
service attacks by scrambling the used frequency bands. The ad hoc context increases the 
number of potential security vulnerabilities. Ad hoc networks can not benefit from the security 
services offered by dedicated equipment such as firewalls, authentication servers and so on. 
The security services must be distributed, cooperative and consistent with the available 
bandwidth.  
One of the serious attacks to be considered in ad hoc network is DDoS attack. A DDoS 
attack is a large-scale, coordinated attack on the availability of services at a victim system or 
network resource. The DDoS attack is launched by sending an extremely large volume of 
packets to a target machine through the simultaneous cooperation of a large number of hosts 
that are distributed throughout the network. The attack traffic consumes the bandwidth 
resources of the network or the computing resource at the target host, so that legitimate requests 
will be discarded. 
 A bandwidth depletion attack is designed to flood the victim network with unwanted 
traffic that prevents legitimate traffic from reaching the victim system. A resource depletion 
attack is an attack that is designed to tie up the resources of a victim system. This type of attack 
targets a server or process at the victim making it unable to legitimate requests for service. Any 
amount of resources can be exhausted with a sufficiently strong attack. The only viable 
approach is to design defense mechanism that will detect the attack and respond to it by 
dropping the excess traffic.  
The DoS attacks that target resources can be grouped into three broad scenarios. The 
first attack scenario targets Storage and Processing Resources. This is an attack that mainly 
targets the memory, storage space, or CPU of the service provider. Consider the case where a 
node continuously sends an executable flooding packet to its neighborhoods and to overload the 
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storage space and deplete the memory of that node. This prevents the node from sending or 
receiving packets from other legitimate nodes. The second attack scenario targets energy 
resources, specifically the battery power of the service provider. A malicious node may 
continuously send a bogus packet to a node with the intention of consuming the victim’s battery 
energy and preventing other nodes from communicating with the node. The use of localized 
monitoring can help in detecting such nodes and preventing their consequences. The third 
attack scenario targets bandwidth. Consider the case where an attacker located between 
multiple communicating nodes wants to waste the network bandwidth and disrupt connectivity. 
This consumes the resources of all neighbors that communicate, overloads the network, and 
results in performance degradations. Such attacks can be prevented based on our proposed 
congestion based defense scheme. 
2    Related Work 
Xiapu Luo et al [1] have presented the important problem of detecting pulsing denial of service 
(PDoS) attacks which send a sequence of attack pulses to reduce TCP throughput. Wei-Shen 
Lai et al [3] have proposed a scheme to monitor the traffic pattern in order to alleviate 
distributed denial of service attacks. Shabana Mehfuz1 et al [4] have proposed a new secure 
power-aware ant routing algorithm (SPA-ARA) for mobile ad hoc networks that is inspired 
from ant colony optimization (ACO) algorithms such as swarm intelligent technique. Xiaoxin 
Wu et al [6] proposed a DoS mitigation technique that uses digital signatures to verify 
legitimate packets, and drop packets that do not pass the verification Ping Yi, Zhoulin Dai, 
Shiyong Zhang and Yiping Zhong [8] have presented a new DOS attack and its defense in ad 
hoc networks. The new DOS attack, called Ad Hoc Flooding Attack(AHFA), can result in 
denial of service when used against on-demand routing protocols for mobile ad hoc networks, 
such as AODV & DSR. John Haggerty, Qi Shi and Madjid Merabti [9] have proposed a new 
approach that utilizes statistical signatures at the router to provide early detection of flooding 
denial-of-service attacks. Wei Ren, Dit-Yan Yeung, Hai Jin, Mei Yang [11] have proposed a 
defense scheme that includes both the detection and response mechanisms. In this paper the 
detection scheme that monitors MAC layer signals and a response scheme based on Explicit 
Congestion Notification (ECN) marking are discussed. But, the method of monitoring the 
sending rates of the nodes is not discussed. Hence identifying the attacking nodes becomes a 
problem. It may also result in increase of false positives and false negatives. Gahng-Seop Ahn 
et al [12] have proposed SWAN, a stateless network model which uses distributed control 
algorithms to deliver service differentiation in mobile wireless ad hoc networks in a simple, 
scalable and robust manner. Giriraj Chauhan and Sukumar Nandi [13] proposed a QoS aware 
on demand routing protocol that uses signal stability as the routing criteria along with other 
QoS metrics. 
3    Proposed Defense Technique 
In this paper, we propose a new defense mechanism which consists of a flow monitoring table 
(FMT) at each node. It contains flow id, source id, packet sending rate and destination id. 
Sending rates are estimated for each flow in the intermediate nodes. The updated FMT is sent 
to the destination along with each flow. After monitoring the MAC layer signals the destination 
sends the Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) bit to notify the sender nodes about the 
congestion. The sender nodes, upon seeing these packets with ECN marking, will then reduce 
their sending rate. If the channel continues to be congested because some sender nodes do not 
reduce their sending rate, it can be found by the destination using the updated FMT. It checks 
the previous sending rate of a flow with its current sending rate. When both the rates are same, 
the corresponding sender of the flow is considered as an attacker. Once the DDoS attackers are 
identified, all the packets from those nodes will be discarded.  
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The two phases of the proposed scheme are Bandwidth querying phase and Data 
transmission phase. In bandwidth querying phase the control messages sent are Bandwidth 
query request and Bandwidth query reply. The request packet includes the source IP address, 
destination IP address, type of the message, flow ID, and requested data rate which is stored in 
the bottleneck bandwidth (BnBW) field. In Bandwidth querying phase of the proposed scheme, 
the node’s FMT information along a path is computed. An intermediate node updates its FMT 
using the BnBW value stored in the reply packet after receiving a REPLY message on the 
reverse path, and then forwards the REPLY to the next node. The available bandwidth ABWj is 
checked first. The reservation of bandwidth for the flow can be made if the value of ABWj is 
greater than or equal to the BnBW value in the REPLY packet. Else, the BnBW value in the 
REPLY packet is overwritten with the smaller value of ABWj. Next, the current BnBW value in 
the REPLY packet is added to the reserved rate RRij, associated with the in-out stream. A FMT 
entry is created with an assigned rate value ARij, set equal to the BnBW value of the REPLY 
packet, if the stream (i, j) was previously inactive. Subsequently, the REPLY packet is 
forwarded to the next node on the reverse path. Finally, based on the value of the BnBW field, 
the source establishes the real-time flow when the REPLY packet reaches the source node.  
 
Distributed Rate Control 
 
The actual rate ACRij is given by 
                                                     ACRij=W*ARij                                                                                        (1) 
Where, 
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where Lc is the link capacity of each link.    
If the source receives the congestion bit (CB), then the assigned rate ARij can be written as 
                                       ARij=ACRij–δ                                                                      (2) 
Where δ is the rate reduction factor. 
The rate monitoring function measures the traffic rate of a given in-out stream over a time 
interval T.  
                                                                        MRij=Cij/T                                                      (3)   
If the measured rate MRij is greater than actual rate ACRij for the next time interval then the 
flow is considered to be an attack flow. Then its status is marked as REJECTED and the 
corresponding source IP address is recorded from the FMT. 
4    Experimental Results 
The network simulator NS2 is used to simulate our proposed algorithm. In our simulation, the 
channel capacity of mobile hosts is set to the same value: 2 Mbps. The distributed coordination 
function (DCF) of IEEE 802.11 is used for wireless LANs as the MAC layer protocol. It has the 
functionality to notify the network layer about link breakage. The simulated traffic is Constant 
Bit Rate (CBR).  
Our simulation settings and parameters are summarized in table 1. 
Table1: Simulation Parameters 
No. of Nodes   80 
Area Size  1200 X 1200 
Mac  802.11 
Radio Range 250m 
Simulation Time  60 sec 
Traffic Source CBR 
Packet Size 512 
Routing Protocol AODV 
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The experiment is carried out with five different normal flow of traffic with the data rate of 50 
kbps and an attacking flow with the data rate of 500 kbps.  The received bandwidth at the 
destination node over a period of time is obtained using the simulation and the results are 
shown in Fig. 1. The proposed system is compared with SWAN [2] and it is observed that the 
bandwidth received for the proposed system is greater compared to the other scheme. The 
bandwidth reservation technique and the distributed rate control technique of our proposed 
method make to achieve more bandwidth received for the legitimate users. Hence we are able 
to obtain greater bandwidth received for our proposed scheme than the SWAN.  
 
 
Fig. 1 Bandwidth Received Vs Time 
 
The number of lost packets at the destination node over the period of time is shown in Fig. 2. 
From the graph, it is known that the number of packets lost for the proposed system is less 
compared to the SWAN. Since the attacking flows are rejected effectively in our proposed 
scheme, the network resources are made available to the legitimate users. This makes the 
dropping rate of legitimate packets low compared to the other scheme.  
 
 
Fig. 2 Lost Packets Vs Time 
 
The simulation is also carried with the variable number of attacking flows. Since the attacker 
are effectively identified and blocked in our scheme, it is again seen that the proposed scheme 
achieves greater received bandwidth. It is also observed that as the number of attackers is 
increased, the bandwidth received gets increased due to greater amount of traffic. The 
simulation results are shown in Fig. 3. 
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Fig. 3 Bandwidth Received Vs Attackers 
The packet delivery ratio is the ratio of the number of packets received successfully and the 
total number of packets sent. Since the proposed scheme is congestion based scheme, the 
distributed rate control is applied when there is a heavy traffic due to the attacking flows. 
Hence the number of dropped packets is well reduced. As the dropped packets are reduced, 
more number of packets is delivered to the destination. Hence greater packet delivery ratio is 
achieved for the proposed scheme. The simulation results are shown in Fig. 4. 
 
Fig. 4 Packet Delivery Ratio Vs Attackers 
 
 
Fig. 5 Dropped Packets Vs Attackers 
The number of dropped packets at the destination node with varying number of attackers is 
shown in Fig. 5. From the graph, it is known that the number of dropped packets for the 
proposed system is less compared to the SWAN. Since the attacking flows are rejected 
effectively, the dropping rate of legitimate packets low compared to the other scheme.  
5    Conclusion  
In this paper, we discussed the DDoS attacks and proposed a defense scheme to mitigate the 
attack in wireless ad hoc networks. Our approach can accurately identify DDoS attack flows 
and consequently apply rate-limiting to the malicious network flows. Our proposed defense 
mechanism identifies the attackers effectively. Once the attackers are identified, the attack 
traffic is discarded. This makes the network resources available to the legitimate users. We 
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compared the performance of our proposed scheme with the SWAN scheme and proved that 
our proposed scheme assures better performance.  By simulation results, we have shown that 
our proposed scheme achieves higher bandwidth received and packet delivery ratio with 
reduced packet drop for legitimate users.  
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